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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THELMA GHOST
Defendant-Appellant.

I'

Case No.
. 12252

vs.

GEORGE GHOST,
Plaintiff-Respondent, )

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS OF FACT
The plaintiff was employed by the Denver and RioGrande Railroad for a period of 48 years, R-53. He was
so employed when the parties were married on February 26, 1937, R-48, and continued such employment to
December 31, 1959, R-53, when he was retired. The defendant received all of the money realized from this, R54, 59, and the later employment, R-56, 59, of the plaintiff up to the date of the separation of the parties on
November 29, 1969, R-54.
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In 1960, the parties went to Santa Cruz, California
for a year, where the plaintiff worked on a ranch, R-53.
The parties returned to Salt Lake City in late 1960 and
the plaintiff obtained employment at Ketchum's. In
1961 he earned $712, in 1962 $1,290, in 1963 $1,200, in
1964, because he was 72 years of age and he could earn
any amount without affecting the social security benefit
being paid, he earned $2,000, in 1965 he earned $150 before he was separated from his employment because of
the state of his health, R-65, and has not worked since
that time.
The defendant removed the plaintiff's name from a
joint tenancy bank account in Zions First National Bank
in 1960, R-53. The balance in said account was about
$2,000 less $108 for bringing the car back from California, R-5. The defendant has had full control of the plaintiff's earnings since the marriage, R-107. The defendant
expended better than $2,000 from plaintiff's funds to repair an apartment house which the defendant inherited
from Margaret Mickaelsen, in addition, she expended
from family funds $1,000 for attorney's fees in a guardianship proceeding of Margaret Mickaelson, incompetant, R-97. The defendant paid the funeral expenses of
Margaret Mickaelson from the plaintiff's funds, R-44,
of $900 plus $90 for a liner for her casket, $60 for opening the grave, $200 per month for nursing home care,
R-95. She paid $90 for a liner for the casket, $60 for
opening the grave, and $700 for the funreal of Marie
Duffy, R-71.
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The defendant gave the plaintiff $5 or $6 per week
during the time he worked for the Denver and Rio
Grande railroad, out of which he had to pay transportation of $4 or $5 per week, R-54.
During the time he worked for Ketchum' s the defendant gave him $5 per week, R-56.
According to the plaintiff's testimony, his wife has
never worked, R-52. Plaintiff has not slept with the defendant for 28 years, R-94. The defendant told the
plaintiff to stay away from her, R-94.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH
CRUEL TREATMENT WHICH CAUSED HIM
GREAT MENTAL DISTRESS, AND THERE
ARE COMPELLING REASONS JUSTIFYING
THE DENIAL OF THE DIVORCE TO THE
PLAINTIFF.
The trial court found that the defendant had treated
the plaintiff in a cruel manner for more than one year
last past and particularly the defendant had not cohabitated with the plaintiff for a period of 28 years. That
the defendant on numerous occasions has called the
plaintiff a son of a bitch and a dirty Greek, and has continually nagged and quarrelled with the plaintiff, and
on or about the 29th day of November, 1969, the defend-
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ant threw the plaintiff's clothes out on the porch and told
him to "get out, this is my property." All of which acts
caused the plaintiff great mental suffering, R-23.
In support of these findings, the plaintiff testified
with reference to the lack of cohabitation with the defendant.
Under direct question by plaintiff's counsel, R-50,
plaintiff testified as follows:
Question: And calling your attention to your
married life, have you lived in separate beds for
a number of years?
Answer: Yes, for 28 years.
Question: You haven't lived together as man
and wife?
Answer: We lived together, but we have different beds.
Question: And did you live together as man
and wife?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Or did you live separately and had
nothing to do with each other.
Answer: Nothing to do with each other, Yes.
On redirect examination the plaintiff testified further about the lack of cohabitation.
Question: George, I asked you if you'd lived as
man and wife with your wife for the last 28 years?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Have you slept with her?
4

Answer: No.
Question: And how long a period has that
been?
Answer: Since that time. May, 1937 we lived
together but we never sleep together. She say stay
away, because you know why? I'll tell you why.
1947 I went to doctor for I get my life insurance.
I go to one doctor up there to test my blood pressure. Do you know what the doctor tell me? He
says: Take care of Mrs. Ghost. She have gonorrhea. That's what he tells be, honest to God.
Question: Well, I know. George, that is not
admissible what the doctor told you. If she were
not present, it's hearsay. But have you slept with
her, that's what my question is.
Answer: No.
Question: And when was that date, 1947?
Answer: 1945 when I went to the doctor to get
my life insurance.
Question: Have you slept with her since that
time?
Answer: No, I never sleep since 1940, '41.
Counsel submits that this testimony substantiates
the finding of the trial court on the question of lack of
cohabitation for 28 years.
Defendant said they have not slept together for 5
years, R-106.
Relative to the defendant calling the plaintiff names
and quarrelling, R-58-59. Questions propounded by
plaintiff's counsel to plaintiff:
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Question : Did she call you some names ?
Answer: Called me a son of a bitch the last
time after she got the property. She got the property in 1967.
Question: And then was that a regular or a
casual-Did she do it often?
Answer: All the time. She called me everything. She never called me those names after she
got the property. 1967, the 6th of July, 1967, she
got the property. She went to make a will for
some friends of hers and she put one dollar for
me. That's all. And she got all my money from
Ketchum, the railroad retirement, Social Securit, she got all my money. She never give me a
penny. In 1968, she give me $15. After that I
went to the boss, I got paid $9 from the boss to
ride every day except Sunday. Give me five or
six dollars, you know, to spend.
Question: Well, what about right before you
left in November, how many meals a day could
you eat? R-57
Answer: Before only two meals a day. Sometime she raise hell and give me-I had a dish of
cucumbers, you know. Took and /eeled them.
She come along, it was Sunday, an hit the dish,
break the dish and I lose everything. I never eat.
Question: And did she treat you that way all
the time?
Answer: All the time.
The Witness: I'll tell you another thing. She
got up from the chair and slap me. I lose my
glasses. She break my glasses.
Question (By Mr. Macfarlane) : Now, when
was this?
6

Answer: Oh, a long time ago, about in '67.
Mr. Rigtrup: I would object to that.
The Witness: '68, all the way. '67, '68, and '60
through, hit me all the time, slap me because I
call Stella. She don't want to hear of Stella, our
friend, and I lose my glasses. I had a hell of a
time finding them. R-58
Question (By Mr. Macfarlane) : Did she do
that in '69?
Answer: Yes .
.Mr. Rigtrup: I would object to Stella's conduct. She's a friend and not the defendant, and
her cruel treatment is not actionable grounds for
the plaintiff in a divorce action .
Mr. Macfarlane: I agree with that and I didn't
perhaps get the answer properly.
.Mr. Rigtrup: \Vell, as I understood itQuestion (By Mr . .Macfarlane): Did your wife
hit you or did Stella hit you?
Answer: No, my wife. I just call Stella .
.Mr . .Macfarlane: That was my understanding,
Ken. It's hard for me and I'm sure for you to
understand, but I understoodThe Witness: I just call her name, Stella. She
get up and slap me.
Question (By Mr. Macfarlane): It was not
Stella that slapped you?
Answer: No. Her. I lost my glasses five or six
times. Cost me $10 and I can't fix it. I got no
money to fix it. R-58
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The plaintiff testified that on the 29th day of November, 1969, that the defendant told the plaintiff to
get out, to get his clothes and get out, this is my property.
She threw the suitcases out. The plaintiff retrieved the
suitcases, packed his clothes, went uptown and borrowed
some money from a friend, returned and got his clothes
and went up to 214 West Second South, where he is
now living, R-51.
The defendant has a severe hearing impairment and
had trouble understanding the questions propounded to
him. The following dialogue illustrates this, R-51.
Question: Now, did that cause you great mental suffering and distress?
Answer: What?
Question: Did this conduct of hers of asking
you to get out, did that cause you some suffering,
pain? Did you feel badly about it?
Answer: Sure I feel badly, yes. I don't know
why. She was too nervous. I don't know. She told
me to get out. That's all.
The respondent submits that there is ample proof
to sustain the trial courts findings and decision. It must
be remembered that the lower court saw the witnesses
and in a case of this kind much could be determined from
their demeanor and from the way they answered the
questions put to them in the court. The Utah court in
the recent case of Stone vs. Stone, September, 1967, 19
Utah 2nd 378, 431 P. 2nd 802, held as follows:
"The Findings and Order are endowed with a
presumption of validity and the burden is upon
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the appellant to show they are in error ... accordingly we recognize that it is the perogative of the
judge to judge the credibility of the witnesses,
and in case of conflict we assume that the trial
court believed the evidence which support the
finding. We review the whole evidence in the
light most favorable to them; and we will not disturb them merely because this court might have
viewed the matter differently, but only if the eviclearly preponderates against the findmgs.
In the case of Stevenson vs. Stevenson, 13 Utah 2nd
153, 369 P. 2nd 923, the Utah court held as follows:
"However, there is no public interest in the
preservation of a marriage where one of the parties can no longer endure the relationship without impairing his or her health; or where the conduct of one party has deteriorated the relationship to the extent that the parties will no longer
continue cohabitation and the marriage exists
only in name and not in fact citing Hendricks vs.
Hendricks, 123 Utah 178, 257 P. 2nd 366; Wilson vs. Wilson, 5 Utah 279, 296 P. 2nd 977;
Curry vs. Curry, 7 Utah 2nd 198, 321 Pacific
2nd 939."
In the case of Anderson vs. Anderson, 18 Utah 2nd
286, 422 P. 2nd 193, the Utah Court said:
"Recent pronouncements of this court, and the
policy to which we adhere are to the effect that
the trial Judge has considerable latitude of discretion in such matters and that his judgment
should not be changed lightly and in fact not at
all, unless it works such a manifest injustice or
inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion."
9

POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT A DECREE OF SEPARATE MAINTENANCE IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT-COUNTERCLAIMANT.
The defendant relied for proof in support of his
prayer for a decree of separate maintenance on the provisions outlined in Section 30-4-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, which provides that when a man deserts his wife
without good and sufficient cause or being of sufficient
ability to support her shall have neglected or refused to
properly provide for or suitably maintain her, the District Court may require such a husband to pay for such
sums of costs, expenses, fees and support as it shall deem
necessary and proper.
The defendant in November, 1969, when the separation of the parties occurred, told the plaintiff to get
out, that the property belonged to her and threw his
suitcases out, R-51, and further told the plaintiff that if
they could not get along it would be well for them to
separate and he was better off with his friends uptown,
R-107. This testimony certainly counteracts any idea
that there was a willful desertion of the defendant by the
plaintiff. Separation in which both parties willingly confer is not lawful desertion of one by the other-Speak vs.
Speak, 81 Utah 423, 19 P. 2nd 386, March 22, 1933.
The testimony also shows that the defendant recieved all of the fruits of the plaintiff's labor from the
date of the marriage in 1938 to the date of separation in

10

1969. The defendant was awarded all of the furniture,
fixtures and effects which were accumulated during the
marraige including the bank account, the apartment
house in which the defendant has an apartment without
cost to her and which has no encumbrances against it and
which has been appraised for $22,000, R-101. The defendant expended better than $2,000 for repairs out of
the plaintiff's funds, R-25-26. In view of this testimony
it cannot be urged that the plaintiff failed to support his
wife who received all the fruits of his employment plus
all of accumulations made during the marriage. The defendant has gross income from rentals of the apartment
house in the sum of $245 per month plus $21. 70 from
Social Security, and up to the present time has been receiving $80.55 on account of the plaintiff's Railroad Retirement earned by him in 48 years of labor with the
Denver and Rio-Grande Railroad Company. The trial
court was aware of the fact that the defendant would
lose the $80.55 of Railroad Retirement when the divorce
became final.
The trial court had all the facts before it as to the
relative amounts of income of each party. The plaintiff,
husband recieves $190.75 monthly Railroad Retirement
and $59.30 Social Security, a total of $250.05.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court
made a fair and equitable distribution of the income and
property in the estate and that his findings are supported by competant evidence.
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POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE DOES XOT SUSTAIN
THE CONCLUSION BY THE LO,VER COURT
THAT DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO
ALIMONY.
'V"ith relation to the right of a wife who had been
married for a number of years to be granted permanent
alimony, in the recent case of Pickens vs. Pickens, August 6, 1970, 24 Utah 2nd 409, 473 P. 2nd 397, the Supreme Court quotes with approval from Christensen vs.
Christensen, 21 Utah 2nd 263, 265, 444 P. 2nd 511, 512,
as follows:
"'Yhether we as individual judges would or
would not have arrived at the exact same formula
as to what the most practical and just treatment
of the economic aspects of this situation is not the
question on this appeal.
"Even though it is the established rule that
divorce cases being in equity it is the duty of this
court to review and weigh the evidence, it is
equally true that we have invariably recognized
the advantaged position of the trial judge and
given deference to his findings and judgment,
declaring that they should not be upset unless
the evidence clearly preponderates against them
or unless the decree works such an injustice that
equity and good conscience demands that it be
revised ....
"Defendant's argument carried to its conclusion
would mean that whenever a marriage has lasted
for a considerable number of years the wife would
always be entitled to permatient alimony.

12

"'Ve do not regard that as the law. Citing
Donald vs. :\lcDonald ( 1951) 120 Utah 573, 236
P. 2nd 1066; Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg 77 Utah
157, 292 P 2H; Hendricks vs. Hendricks 91
C tah 553, 63 P. 2nd 277.
In the case of Allen vs. Allen, 109 Utah 2nd 99, 165
P. 2nd 872, 875, the Utah Court _said:
"'Ve believe that the great weight of authority
supports the rule that a decree of the trial court
in divorce proceedings relative to alimony and division of property will not be modified except
when the trial court has abused its discretion.
Otherwise the appellate court by its own actions
would alter the purpose for which it was created.
An appellate court cannot remain a court of appeals and invite a review of every case decided by
a lower tribunal where its judgment fails to satisfy one or both parties to the litigation."
Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
granting of alimony and the distribution of property in
a divorce action rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court. In this case, the defendant wife, was awarded
all of the property accumulated during the marriage, including an apartment house valued at $22,000, in which
the defendant lived rent free, with a gross rental of $245
per month, plus $21. 70 from Social Security making a
gross of $266.70 and an apartment free of rent. The
plaintiff was awarded a total of $250.05 per month and
no property.
Plaintiff submits that this distribution of property
and income was fair and equitable to both parties and
the findings are supported by competant evidence.
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POINT IV.
IT 'VAS ERROR FOR THE LO\VER
COURT TO REQUIRE
COUNSEL TO CHOOSE BET\VEEN CONTINUED
PARTICIPATION IN THE TRIAL AND GIVING TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE REASONABLE VALUE OF HIS ATTORNEY'S
FEES.
The Revised rules of the Utah State llar governing
professional conduct and discipline were adopted May
28, 1946 and approved by the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah March 1, 1937, with amendments effective March 19, 1940 and June 18, 1952, as published in
Volume XXII, special number, November, 1952, of the
Utah Bar Bulletin. These rules remained in effect until
the Code of Professional Responsibility was approved
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on February
19, 1971. The case at bar was tried on April 23, 1970.
Rule III Conduct Prescribed by Rule, Section 32,
in paragraph 19, page 12, in effect when the case was
tried, provided:
"'Vhen a lawyer is a witness for a client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the
attestation or custody of an instrument and the
like, he should leave the trial of the case to other
counsel. Except when essential to the ends of
justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court
in behalf of his client."
It appears that the court made the proper ruling in
this matter as the testimony of the defendant's counsel
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was not essential to further the ends of justice, in that
his testimony was to relate only to the amount of his
attorney's fees, which is not merely a formal matter.
Defendant also cited the case of MacClaren vs.
Gillespie, decided in 1899, and State vs. Greene decided
in 1911. The applicable rule above cited governing professional conduct and discipline had not been adopted at
the time these two cases were decided and hence they are
not applicable in this matter.
Defendant cites ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5 (DR 5-102) this canon was not in
effect in Utah at the time of the trial April 23, 1970.
Defendant has cited two Utah cases in support of
his position that a claim for attorney's fees cannot be
solely supported by the suggested bar schedule but the
moving party must introduce evidence to establish the
reasonable worth thereof. In the case of FMA Financial Corporation vs. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2nd 80, 404 P.
2nd 670, the Utah Court held:
"There is merit in the defendant's challenge to
the award of $775 attorney's fees to the plaintiff
without any evidence or stipulation in the record.
"In the instant case there was both evidence
elicited by defendant from the plaintiff's counsel,
R-93, under oath and a stipulation by plaintiff's
counsel that the court could fix the attorney's fee
from his experience. R-86"
The other case cited was Utah Savings & Loan
Association vs. James D. Nunley, 17 Utah 2nd 348, 411
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P. 2nd 838. Appeal from an award of attorney's fees in
a foreclosure action in which the defendant had filed a
general denial of the amount of the fee claimed.
No testimony was offered and no stipulation was
agreed to by the parties as to what was a reasonable fee.
After the def end ant's counsel had left the courtroom,
the plaintiff's counsel suggested a fee consonant with the
County Bar Association schedule. The trial judge made
such an award. These facts are distinguishable from the
instant case where we haw both testimony and a stipulation as to the reasonable amount of the attorney's fee.
Plaintiff submits that the trial court ruled correctly
governing professional conduct in force at the time of
the trial.

POINT V.
THE \VEIGHT OF THE EV IDEN CE SUPPORTED THE AWARD OF A LARGER ATTORNEY FEE.
The defendant complains of the amount of the attorney's fees found by the trial court in the sum of $125.
The weight of his objection seems to be that the trial
court did not fix a fee for the appeal of the cause.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Anderson
vs. Anderson, decided April 7, 1919 reported in 54 Utah
309, 181 Pac. 168, 169 held that the trial judge had the
right to consult his own experience and knowledge, with16

out taking testimony as to what was reasonable in the
particular case. This case was cited with approval in the
case of Gardner vs. Gardner, ll8 Utah 496, 222 P.
2nd 1056, 1058.
Plaintiff submits that the matter of fixing of attorney's fees was stipulated to by the plaintiff and testified to by plaintiff's counsel and the trial court fixed the
fee from his own experience and knowledge.

CONCLUSION
We believe the evidence abundantly justifies the
Decree of the trial court and should be affirmed by the
Supreme Court. The defendant received all the fruits
of a lifetime of labor by the plaintiff and all the property
acquired during the marriage. Defendant is adequately
provided for. The court's judgment will permit the
plaintiff to have a few years to enjoy life without the
restraining influence of the defendant. The plaintiff
hopes that he can spend his last days in his native country, Greece.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT MACFARLANE, SR.

752 Union Pacific Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Counsel for Respondent
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